



Silver & Rock

ESTD 2025

SILVER & ROCK | INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES

The Quiet Repricing

How Regulatory Divergence Between the UK, US and Nigeria Is Reshaping Capital Allocation in the Energy Transition

FEBRUARY 2026 | INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES — EDITION I
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE | UK · US · NIGERIA

Silver & Rock *Clarity at Inflection Points*
LONDON · LAGOS

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01 Executive Summary

A quiet repricing is under way. Not in any single asset class or instrument, but in the regulatory architectures that determine where energy transition capital can flow, at what cost, and on what terms. Global energy transition investment reached a record \$2.3 trillion in 2025¹ — yet beneath this headline figure lies a more consequential story: the three markets that matter most to our principals are diverging in ways that will reshape capital allocation for the next decade.

The United Kingdom is accelerating through institutional coordination. The United States is introducing regulatory friction that compresses timelines and raises structuring costs. Nigeria presents the world's largest energy access deficit — and, by extension, its largest underpriced opportunity. Each market now demands a distinct capital strategy. A single “energy transition allocation” is no longer sufficient.

\$2.3T

Global energy transition investment in 2025, up 8% year-on-year

\$378B

US clean energy investment despite policy uncertainty

86.6M

Nigerians without grid electricity — the world's largest access deficit

THE DIVERGENCE IN BRIEF

- 1 Global energy transition investment rose 8% year-on-year to \$2.3 trillion, with electrified transport overtaking renewable energy as the largest category at \$893 billion.¹ The headline growth masks a deceleration from 27% in 2021 — signalling maturation, not retreat.
- 2 Clean energy supply investment (\$1.29 trillion) surpassed fossil fuel supply investment (\$1.19 trillion) for the third consecutive year.² This is now structural, not cyclical.
- 3 The UK is accelerating. Great British Energy (GBE) has been capitalised to mobilise £15 billion in private finance and deliver 15 GW of clean generation by 2030, within a £725 billion ten-year infrastructure strategy.⁵ Policy stability is high; execution is the binding constraint.
- 4 The US is recalibrating. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), signed July 2025, introduced accelerated phase-outs of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) tax credits, creating acute near-term policy uncertainty — yet \$378 billion still flowed into US energy transition in 2025, a 3.5% increase.¹ Economics are decoupling from policy.
- 5 Nigeria presents the starkest asymmetry. 86.6 million people lack grid electricity.¹⁵ The Energy Transition Plan (ETP) targets 30 GW of renewable capacity by 2030. The Nigeria Tax Act 2025 imposes a 5% surcharge on fossil fuels. The constraint is not demand or resource potential — it is capital structure.

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Achieving Nigeria’s net-zero target by 2060 requires approximately \$500 billion above business-as-usual — but projected fuel savings of \$686 billion demonstrate the economic logic.¹⁷ Patient, appropriately structured capital will find a market that is underpriced by any reasonable measure.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR CAPITAL

Multi-jurisdiction strategies now require separate risk frameworks. The cost of capital for the same underlying technology diverges materially across the UK, US and Nigeria due to regulatory architecture, not project economics. Blended allocations that treat “energy transition” as a single category will misprice risk.

Policy stability is the new yield premium. The UK’s institutional architecture — Contracts for Difference (CfD) auctions, GBE, sovereign green bonds at “dark green” rating — offers the most predictable deployment environment. Capital seeking low structuring cost and long duration is rewarded here.

The US demands speed and optionality. OBBBA compresses timelines: wind and solar facilities must commence construction before July 2026 to access residual credits. Capital that can move quickly, structure around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions, and tolerate regulatory ambiguity will capture outsized near-term returns.

Nigeria rewards patient, blended structures. The gap between capital required (\$500 billion) and capital mobilised (\$3.6 billion) is the single largest asymmetry in the global transition. Enterprises deploying concessional mechanisms, local-currency instruments and mini-grid finance will access extraordinary growth (18.9% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) to 2035) with limited competition.

Three Markets at a Glance

A DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR PRINCIPALS

United Kingdom	United States	Nigeria
<p>POLICY STANCE Accelerating. Cross-party net-zero consensus. GBE capitalised; CfD reformed; £725B pipeline.</p> <p>COST OF CAPITAL DIRECTION Declining. Sovereign green bonds at S&P “dark green.” Institutional architecture de-risks deployment.</p> <p>PRIMARY BOTTLENECK Execution. Wind must double by 2030. Grid connections lagging. Supply chain constraints.</p> <p>BEST-FIT CAPITAL STRUCTURES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-duration infrastructure equity via CfD • Green bond-aligned debt (UK Green Financing Framework) • Supply-chain manufacturing (£1B GBE programme) <p>ACTION FOR PRINCIPALS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Position for CfD Round 7 and REMA zonal pricing. → Evaluate GBE’s first portfolio for co-investment at £15B scale. 	<p>POLICY STANCE In flux. OBBBA reverses IRA. FEOC adds supply chain complexity. Treasury guidance pending.</p> <p>COST OF CAPITAL DIRECTION Rising for policy-dependent projects. Stable for self-sustaining tech. Data centre floor.</p> <p>PRIMARY BOTTLENECK Policy certainty. Permitting queues (physical). Regulatory ambiguity (financial).</p> <p>BEST-FIT CAPITAL STRUCTURES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tax-equity closing before July 2026 deadline • Grid modernisation and electrified transport • FEOC-compliant domestic content supply chains <p>ACTION FOR PRINCIPALS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Audit pipelines against OBBBA phase-outs. → Monitor Treasury safe harbour tables (due Dec 2026). 	<p>POLICY STANCE Constructive but capital-constrained. Net-zero 2060. Electricity Act 2023. Tax Act surcharge.</p> <p>COST OF CAPITAL DIRECTION High, declining at margin. Blended finance reducing rates. BII \$100M platform signals appetite.</p> <p>PRIMARY BOTTLENECK Capital structure. Debt servicing at 85% of energy investment. \$3.6B vs \$500B needed.</p> <p>BEST-FIT CAPITAL STRUCTURES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mini-grid / distributed solar (World Bank / BII platforms) • Blended capital with concessional first-loss • Local-currency instruments to mitigate FX <p>ACTION FOR PRINCIPALS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> → Engage REA and ETO — courting OEMs and capital partners. → Size against fuel savings: \$686B vs \$500B. Early movers win.

02 The Global Landscape


A RECORD YEAR, A DECELERATING TRAJECTORY

The global energy transition has entered a new phase. Investment continues to set records, but the rate of acceleration has slowed — from 27% annual growth in 2021 to 8% in 2025.¹ This signals maturation, not retreat. The core technologies — solar photovoltaics (PV), lithium-ion batteries, onshore wind, electric vehicles (EVs) — are now commercially self-sustaining in most major markets.

BloombergNEF (BNEF) records \$2.3 trillion in global energy transition investment in 2025.¹ The International Energy Agency's (IEA) broader measure places the figure at \$3.3 trillion, of which \$2.2 trillion targeted clean energy.² By either measure, clean energy now materially exceeds fossil fuel supply investment.

The composition of investment has shifted. Electrified transport was the largest category in 2025 at \$893 billion, up 21%.¹ Renewable energy recorded \$690 billion but declined 9.5% — driven by China's shift to market-based pricing and persistent solar overcapacity.

Global Energy Transition Investment, 2018-2025




Source: BloombergNEF Energy Transition Investment Trends 2026

Figure 1: Global energy transition investment hit \$2.3 trillion in 2025, but annual growth has decelerated from 27% to 8%.¹

Source: BNEF, Energy Transition Investment Trends 2026.

Power grid investment rose 17% to \$483 billion, reflecting a belated recognition that generation capacity without adequate transmission infrastructure delivers diminished returns.² Energy storage reached \$71 billion, while carbon capture, nuclear and hydrogen collectively remained below \$55 billion.

Global Energy Transition Investment by Sector, 2025



Source: BloombergNEF Energy Transition Investment Trends 2026

Figure 2: Electrified transport overtook renewables as the largest investment category in 2025.¹


Source: BNEF, 2026.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF CAPITAL

The regional distribution reveals structural asymmetries. China remained the largest market at \$800 billion but posted its first decline since 2013. The European Union (EU) invested \$455 billion (+18%). The US recorded \$378 billion (+3.5%). India continued upward at \$68 billion (+15%).¹

Africa, despite holding approximately 60% of the world's best solar potential, accounts for just 1% of global installed solar PV capacity.³ Debt servicing costs across the continent equal over 85% of total energy investment² — a constraint no resource endowment can overcome without fundamental reform of how transition capital is structured in frontier markets.

Energy Transition Investment by Region, 2025




Source: BloombergNEF Energy Transition Investment Trends 2026

Figure 3: China still dominates, but EU and US together now rival its annual flow.¹

Source: BNEF, 2026; IEA, 2025.

Clean energy supply investment has surpassed fossil fuel supply investment for three consecutive years. The question is no longer whether the transition will happen, but how equitably the capital will flow.

Global Clean Energy vs. Fossil Fuel Supply Investment



Source: IEA World Energy Investment 2025; BloombergNEF

Figure 4: Clean energy supply has structurally overtaken fossil fuel supply investment.²

Source: IEA, World Energy Investment, 2025.

03 United Kingdom

THE INSTITUTIONAL ACCELERATOR

KEY TAKEAWAYS

What changed: Labour’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan and GBE capitalisation create the most coordinated policy architecture in any major Western economy.


What it means: The UK is an optimisation play — high policy stability, advanced CfD and green bond frameworks, but moderate growth and execution constraints on grid and supply chains.

Where capital wins: Long-duration, CfD-backed infrastructure equity. Green bond-aligned debt. GBE co-investment mandates leveraging £15 billion in private mobilisation.

The United Kingdom has positioned itself as the most institutionally committed of our three focus markets. The Labour Government’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, published December 2024, sets out a pathway to decarbonise the electricity system by the end of the decade.⁶ The policy architecture being constructed around it — GBE, the National Wealth Fund (NWF), reformed CfD auctions — represents the most coordinated approach to energy transition governance in any major Western economy.

Renewable generation increased from approximately 10 TWh in the late 1990s to 145 TWh in 2024. Fossil fuels accounted for 38% of power supply in 2024 and are projected to decline to 19% by 2030.⁷ Each unit of electricity produced in 2025 carries an emissions intensity of 136g of CO₂, down from 519g in 2008.

UK Electricity Generation Mix, 2010-2024



Source: DESNZ, Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2025; EMBER Yearly Electricity Data

Figure 5: UK fossil fuel share is projected to halve from 38% (2024) to 19% by 2030.⁷

Source: Wood Mackenzie, February 2025; HM Government.

GBE, capitalised at £8.3 billion, targets at least 15 GW of clean generation and storage, £15 billion in private finance mobilisation, over 1,000 community energy projects, and 10,000+ GBE-backed jobs.⁵ Its £1 billion “Energy — Engineered in the UK” programme links the transition to industrial strategy.

The ten-year infrastructure strategy earmarks £725 billion across transport, energy, nuclear, water and social infrastructure.⁹ The Autumn Budget 2025 added three consequential measures: a new Oil and Gas Price Mechanism replacing the Energy Profits Levy, nuclear energy included in the UK Green Financing Framework (S&P “dark green”), and removal of certain social levies from energy bills.

The constraints are real. Wind capacity must approximately double by 2030 and triple by 2050. The Climate Change Committee (CCC) assessed net-zero as “within reach, provided the government stays the course,”⁸ but Wood Mackenzie suggests the UK is not yet on track, with emissions expected to decrease by only 66% by 2035 against a targeted 81%.⁷

CAPITAL IMPLICATIONS

What is rewarded: Long-duration, CfD-backed infrastructure equity. Sovereign green bond-aligned debt. Patient capital matching the ten-year deployment horizon.

What is penalised: Short-cycle speculative positioning. Projects dependent on unsecured grid connections. Structures unable to absorb supply chain cost inflation.

Structures that win: CfD revenue certainty; Green Financing Framework issuance channel; GBE co-investment mandates leveraging £15B in private capital mobilisation.

Timeline / gating item: CfD Allocation Round 7 outcomes and Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) zonal pricing conclusion. Both materially reset UK project economics in 2026.

What to do next: Map portfolio exposure against Clean Power 2030 targets. Identify where GBE priorities (15 GW, 1,000 community projects, £1B supply chain) align with deployable capital.

The UK has constructed the most coherent institutional architecture for the energy transition in the Western world. The question is whether execution can match ambition within the compressed timeline.

04 United States

POLICY WHIPLASH AND STRUCTURAL RESILIENCE

KEY TAKEAWAYS

What changed: OBBBA (July 2025) accelerated phase-outs of IRA tax credits — wind/solar must commence construction by July 2026 for residual eligibility. FEOC restrictions add supply chain complexity.


What it means: The US is a timing play — abundant capital and deep talent, but acute policy uncertainty. Economics are decoupling from policy: \$378 billion still deployed in 2025.

Where capital wins: Tax-equity structures closing before July 2026 deadline. Grid modernisation. Data centre energy procurement contracts creating a structural demand floor.

The United States presents the most complex case study. The IRA (\$369 billion in energy and climate initiatives) catalysed \$422 billion in private investment across 751 projects and 406,000 clean energy jobs by January 2025.¹² Critically, the IRA established a ten-year policy horizon — ending the boom-bust cycles that had constrained institutional deployment.

That horizon was materially shortened on 4 July 2025, when President Trump signed the OBBBA. The legislation introduced accelerated phase-outs: wind and solar facilities beginning construction after July 2026 become ineligible for clean electricity investment credits if placed in service after December 2027.¹¹ Several EV and residential credits were terminated outright, with the Clean Vehicle Credit ending 30 September 2025 and residential clean energy credits terminating 31 December 2025.

US Energy Transition Investment, 2019-2025



Source: BloombergNEF; Arnold & Porter OBBBA Analysis, July 2025

Figure 6: Despite policy headwinds, US energy transition investment rose 3.5% to \$378 billion in 2025.¹

Source: BNEF, 2026.

The OBBBA also introduced FEOC restrictions, barring certain foreign entities from credits — with significant implications for China-dependent supply chains.¹¹ Domestic content requirements were tightened, and the

Department of the Treasury must publish safe harbour tables for Manufactured Article Component Ratios by December 2026.

Yet the aggregate data tells a story of resilience. US energy transition investment reached \$378 billion in 2025, a 3.5% increase.¹ Growth came from grid modernisation and electrified transport, offsetting renewable energy declines. A critical distinction from the previous Trump administration: energy transition technologies are materially more mature and less subsidy-dependent than in 2017.

Wall Street has responded pragmatically. Over \$675 million in fresh credit lines for clean energy developers were earmarked in a single month in mid-2025, atop the \$1.2 trillion debt issuance market the IRA created.¹³ The OBBBA compresses timelines but does not reverse the economics: solar and battery costs continue falling, and data centre demand creates a structural floor independent of climate policy.

CAPITAL IMPLICATIONS

What is rewarded: Speed. Capital commencing construction before July 2026 captures residual credits. Grid modernisation and data centre procurement growing independent of climate policy.

What is penalised: Policy-dependent pipelines with long timelines. FEOC-exposed supply chains. Residential and EV credit-dependent models (credits terminated Sep–Dec 2025).

Structures that win: Tax-equity with accelerated close. FEOC-compliant domestic content. Grid-adjacent investments (17% growth, \$483B globally) and data centre procurement contracts.

Timeline / gating item: Treasury guidance on 45Y/48E under OBBBA and safe harbour tables for component ratios (due December 2026). These define eligibility for the next cycle.

What to do next: Stress-test US exposures against OBBBA phase-outs. Model permissive and restrictive Treasury scenarios. Position for grid and storage — the \$1.2T debt market persists.

Policy risk is now the binding constraint on US clean energy deployment — not economics, not technology, and not demand. Capital follows certainty, and the current environment provides less of it than any comparable jurisdiction.

05 Nigeria

THE ACCESS IMPERATIVE

KEY TAKEAWAYS

What changed: Electricity Act 2023 enables state-level licensing for decentralised deployment. Tax Act 2025 adds 5% fossil fuel surcharge. British International Investment (BII) launched a \$100 million mini-grid platform.


What it means: Nigeria is a structuring play — the world's largest energy access deficit (86.6 million unelectrified), extraordinary solar resources, and \$686 billion in projected fuel savings vs. \$500 billion investment needed.

Where capital wins: Mini-grid and distributed solar finance via blended structures. Local-currency instruments. Patient capital willing to engineer around grid deficiency (50% losses) and sovereign credit constraints.

Nigeria's energy transition narrative is fundamentally different from those of the UK and US. Where advanced economies debate decarbonisation pace, Nigeria confronts a prior question: how to provide electricity to all 86.6 million people — approximately 39% of the population — who have no grid connection, making it the country with the world's largest energy access deficit.¹⁵

Electricity access reached 61.2% in 2023, up from 54.4% in 2015²² — but the average masks a stark divide: 91% urban, 30% rural. Grid losses run at approximately 50%, more than triple international good practice. Unreliable power costs the economy an estimated \$25 billion annually, or 5–7% of gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁹

Nigeria: The World's Largest Energy Access Deficit



Source: World Bank, Tracking SDG7 (2025); Macrotrends (2024)

Figure 7: Nigeria's electricity access has risen from 54% to 61%, but 86.6 million remain unconnected.¹⁵

Source: World Bank / SDG7 Tracking, 2025; Macrotrends.

Against this backdrop, the ETP — unveiled at the 26th UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) and updated in 2024 — targets net-zero by 2060 and 30 GW of renewable capacity by 2030.¹⁶ Solar is the backbone, with 5 GW deployment targets. Achieving net-zero requires approximately \$500 billion above business-as-usual, but projects fuel savings of \$686 billion.¹⁷

Legislative momentum has accelerated. The Electricity Act 2023 enables state-level regulation and licensing for decentralised deployment. The Nigeria Tax Act 2025 introduces a 5% fossil fuel surcharge.²⁰ The 2025 budget allocated NGN100 billion for institutional solar systems, displacing diesel generators.

The most consequential development is the rapid expansion of solar mini-grids. Over 100 are operational via a World Bank-funded project. BII has launched a \$100 million platform targeting hundreds of thousands of households. The Rural Electrification Agency (REA) sits at the centre of what Chatham House calls “Africa’s most ambitious energy transformation.”¹⁸

Nigeria’s solar resource potential is extraordinary: 5.5 kWh per square metre per day.¹⁶ Africa holds 60% of the world’s best solar potential but accounts for just 1% of installed solar PV.³ The Energy Transition Office (ETO) has mobilised \$3.6 billion to date and is actively courting original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for local panel and battery assembly.

CAPITAL IMPLICATIONS

What is rewarded: Patient, blended finance. Concessional + commercial tranches. Mini-grid / distributed solar (BII \$100M platform). Local manufacturing (ETO courting OEMs).

What is penalised: Capital assuming reliable grid dispatch (50% losses). Conventional project finance on sovereign credit. FX-unhedged naira revenue streams.

Structures that win: Electricity Act 2023 enables state licensing (decentralised deployment). Tax Act’s 5% fossil surcharge strengthens renewable economics. Blended structures with first-loss tranches.

Timeline / gating item: Carbon Budget working group progress and mini-grid scale-up via BII. Local solar manufacturing capacity determines whether supply chains support 30 GW.

What to do next: Engage REA and ETO. Size the opportunity: 86.6M unelectrified, 5.5 kWh/m²/day solar, 18.9% CAGR to 2035. \$686B savings vs \$500B investment favours early movers.

Nigeria’s energy transition is not principally a climate story. It is an economic development story, an industrialisation story, and a demographic story — and the arithmetic is compelling.

06 Comparative Analysis

THREE MARKETS, THREE ARCHITECTURES

The following framework compares the three markets across six dimensions consequential for capital allocation decisions:

Dimension	United Kingdom	United States	Nigeria
Policy Stability	High. Cross-party net-zero consensus; institutional continuity via GBE and CCC.	Low. OBBBA reverses IRA; FEOC adds supply chain uncertainty.	Moderate. Net-zero 2060 supported; execution depends on fiscal capacity.
Capital Availability	Strong. £725B infrastructure plan; sovereign green bonds at “dark green.”	Abundant but cautious. \$378B in 2025; Wall Street hedging policy risk.	Constrained. Debt servicing 85% of energy investment; \$3.6B vs \$500B.
Regulatory Framework	Advanced. CfD auctions, capacity market reform, REMA review.	In flux. IRA/OBBBA dual-track; Treasury guidance pending.	Developing. Electricity Act 2023 decentralisation; Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) capacity building.
Grid Infrastructure	Adequate but strained. Grid investment needed; offshore wind connections lagging.	Insufficient. Permitting and interconnection queues binding.	Severely deficient. 50% T&C losses; grid cannot dispatch generation.
Talent & Supply Chain	Growing. 10,000+ GBE jobs; £1B supply chain programme.	Deep but exposed. 406,000 IRA jobs; FEOC disrupting sourcing.	Nascent. Local manufacturing emerging; REA skills transfer with OEMs.
Growth Trajectory	Moderate. Decarbonisation of mature system; clean power by 2030.	Uncertain. Policy-dependent; data centre demand as floor.	Highest potential. 86.6M unelectrified; 18.9% CAGR to 2035.

Table 1: Six-dimension comparison of UK, US and Nigeria energy transition architectures. | Source: Silver & Rock analysis

ALLOCATION IMPLICATION

The table reveals a structural pattern principals should price into allocation decisions. The UK offers the highest policy stability and regulatory advancement, but moderate growth — it is an *optimisation play* for capital seeking predictable, long-duration returns. The US offers abundant capital and deep talent, but acute policy uncertainty — it is a *timing play* for capital that can move within compressed windows. Nigeria offers the highest growth trajectory and resource endowment, but constrained capital and severe grid deficiency — it is a *structuring play* for patient capital willing to engineer around infrastructure gaps. No single market satisfies all dimensions.

RISK AND OPPORTUNITY MATRIX

Dimension	United Kingdom	United States	Nigeria
Policy stability	High	Low	Medium
Bankability	High	Medium	Low
Execution risk	Medium	Medium	High
FX risk	Low	Low	High
Grid constraint	Medium	High	High
Growth upside	Medium	Medium	High

Table 2: Qualitative risk–opportunity assessment. Green = favourable. Amber = neutral. Red = material constraint. | Source: Silver & Rock analysis

Reading note: “High” in policy stability, bankability and growth upside is favourable. “High” in execution risk, FX risk and grid constraint is unfavourable.

07 The House View

WHAT WE ARE OBSERVING

Our experience across markets indicates that the global energy transition has reached a stage where three distinct investment architectures are forming simultaneously — each with its own risk profile, return characteristics and strategic implications for decision-makers.

I. The era of policy divergence is the dominant feature

For the first time, the three major market archetypes are moving in fundamentally different directions. The UK is accelerating through institutional coordination. The US is introducing regulatory friction that compresses timelines and redirects capital toward structures qualifying under tighter windows. Nigeria is building institutional capacity while managing sovereign debt constraints. The implication is direct: enterprises positioning across jurisdictions must now maintain distinct risk frameworks for each.

II. Economics have decoupled from policy

The most consequential development of 2025: clean energy investment grew despite US federal policy deterioration. Solar costs, battery economics and EV adoption have reached a point where the transition proceeds on commercial logic alone. Policy is now an accelerant or a brake — it no longer determines direction. For UK-exposed principals, economic fundamentals are robust regardless of government. For US-exposed principals, the concern is not viability but structuring cost and regulatory complexity.

III. Nigeria is the asymmetric opportunity

The arithmetic is stark. A country of 230 million — projected to reach 400 million by 2050 — with the world's largest energy access deficit, extraordinary solar resources, and \$25 billion in annual GDP losses from unreliable power.¹⁹ The capital required (\$500 billion above BAU) is large in absolute terms but modest relative to fuel savings (\$686 billion) and economic value unlocked by universal electrification. The constraint is not resource potential or policy direction; it is capital structure. Enterprises providing patient, appropriately structured finance — blended capital, concessional mechanisms, local-currency instruments — will find a market that is, by any reasonable measure, underpriced.

IV. What we are watching in the next 12–24 months

Trigger	Why it matters	What it moves
CfD Allocation Round 7 (UK)	Sets clearing prices and volume for the next tranche of UK renewables.	UK wind/solar equity returns; pipeline bankability.
REMA zonal pricing conclusion (UK)	Determines shift to locational pricing — reshaping asset value by geography.	Grid investment priorities; regional project economics.

Trigger	Why it matters	What it moves
GBE's first investment portfolio (UK)	Signals which technologies government will co-invest in, unlocking £15B.	Deal flow; co-investment eligibility; supply chain.
Treasury guidance on 45Y/48E (US)	Defines which credits survive. Single most consequential US policy variable.	Eligibility; tax-equity returns; deployment timelines.
Project commencements before Jul 2026 (US)	Wind/solar must commence by July 2026 for residual credits. Rush expected.	Deal volume; construction cost inflation.
Data centre energy procurement (US)	Creating structural floor under clean power independent of climate policy.	Long-term power purchase agreement (PPA) volumes; baseload thesis.
Carbon Budget working group (Nigeria)	Governance framework for emissions pathway and sector caps.	Regulatory credibility; investor comfort.
Mini-grid scale-up via BII (Nigeria)	Tests blended finance at pace: \$100M targeting hundreds of thousands.	Proof of concept for distributed energy finance.
Local solar manufacturing (Nigeria)	OEM panel and battery assembly. Local supply chains determine 30 GW feasibility.	Supply chain risk; cost; political sustainability.
BNEF 25% growth projection (Global)	If achieved, confirms momentum survives US headwinds. If missed, signals deceleration.	Global allocation confidence; jurisdiction weighting.

Table 3: Watchlist: 10 triggers that will shape capital allocation decisions in 2026–2027. | Source: Silver & Rock analysis

The energy transition is no longer a thesis. It is a capital allocation reality with a \$2.3 trillion annual flow. The principals and institutions that will benefit most are those who approach it with the rigour it now demands: jurisdiction-specific analysis, technology-neutral assessment, and a willingness to engage with complexity rather than defaulting to the headline narrative.

Methodology, Sources and Endnotes

This white paper draws on publicly available data from institutional research houses, multilateral organisations and government sources. All statistics are cited with their originating source and date of publication. Where multiple sources report different figures for the same metric, we have noted the discrepancy and relied on the source with the most rigorous methodology.

ENDNOTES

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